De Angelis is a Carmelite treatise about angels and their nature. (Carmel in this context is the contemplative religious order reformed in the 16th century by Teresa of Avila.) De Angelis is part of a larger volume of Carmelite speculations known as the Salamanticensis, written throughout the 1600s and 1700s at the University of Salamanca in Spain. To my knowledge, the text contained on this webpage is the first-ever translation of De Angelis into English.

A portion of De Angelis is presented here with the original Latin and its accompanying English translation interleaved. The workflow for creating the English text was to digitally transcribe the Latin text from PDF images of its 1725 publication, then auto-translate the transcribed Latin into English using Google translate. I am cognizant that this is distinct in kind from a scholarly translation, and there are surely imperfections in the auto-translation that will be refined in future iterations of this translation effort. This is a work in progress and a labor of love.

I owe special thanks to Fr. Steve Molvarec for locating a PDF of 1725 Latin text, to Emily Goodrich for assisting in its transcription, to Kasey Kimball for her guidance and support of the project, and to Br. John-Mary Winter for alerting me to the existence of the text in the first place.

What follows is only a small portion of De Angelis. However, my intention is to create a full English translation of De Angelis, with a prayer that angelic discourse may helps us reimagine, reinterpret, and reanimate our lives and world in ways that accord with “better angels” of nature.

DE ANGELIS

Written by the Carmelite scholars
at the University of Salamanca.
Published in 1725.

Disputatio II

De Intellectu Angeli

Præmissa disputatione de Angelorum substantia, rectus procednedi modus exigit, ut de eorum proprietatibus sermo instituatur. Hæ funt intellectus & voluntas: sed quia intellectus est prior origine & dignitate, prius de illo, necnon de ejus comprincipiis, hoc est de speciebus, & de intellectione, agendum est. Sed in limine hujus disputationis plura debent supponi utpote percinentia & exagitata in aliis tractatibus. Nam primo debet supponi, Angelos esse substantias intellectuales, id est intellectu præditos. Hoc præterquamquod eft de side, & colligitur ex pluribus sacræ paginæ testimoniis, satis constata ex dictis tract. 3. Disput. 1. Dub. 1. Ubi cum D. Thoma oftendimus, omnem substantiam immaterialem esse cognofcitivam, & purè spiritualem effe intellectivam. Debet deinde supponi cum communi catculo Thomisrarum, contra communem sentenciam Jesuitarum, & scotistarum., intellectum Angeli esse realiter fistinctum ab ejus natura. Debet etiam suppoui, intellectionem effe distinctam realiter ab ejus incellectu, & potiori titulo ab ejus substantia: Quia de edjus conceptu eft, quod fit vitalis; sed est contra conceptum vitæ in actu secundo indentitas realis cum suo principio: ergo debet dari distinctio realis inter intellectum angelicum, & quamlibet ejus intellectionem. Maximè: quia fola potentia infinita, & quæ lit actus purus identificat realiter fuum actum decundum. Debet tandem supponi ex libris de Anima, ad quamlibet incellectionum requiri aliquam speciem. His pręsuppositis. 

Discussion II

On the Intellect of Angels

Having begun the discussion about the substance of the Angels, the correct way of proceeding requires that a discussion be instituted about their properties. These are the intellect and the will: but since the intellect is prior to its origin and dignity, it must be dealt with first of that, as well as of its co-principles, this is of species and understanding. But at the threshold of this discussion several things must be assumed, as pertinence and agitation in other treatises. For in the first place it must be supposed that angels are intellectual substances, that is, possessed of intellect. This, moreover, is from the side, and is gathered from several testimonies of the sacred page, sufficiently ascertained from the said tract. 3. Dispute 1. Doubt. 1. Where, with D. Thomas, we observed that every immaterial substance is cognitive, and that purely spiritual is actually intellectual. It must then be assumed, with the general opinion of the Thomasians, contrary to the common opinion of the Jesuits and the Scots, that the angel’s intellect was really suppressed by his nature. I must also suppose that the understanding is really distinct from its intelligibility, and with a better title from its substance: Because it is from its conception that it becomes vital; but it is against the concept of life in the second act that the real is indented with its principle: therefore a real distinction must be made between the angelic intellect and any of its intellects. Most of all: because the folly has infinite power, and what lit pure act really identifies the act of sin. Finally, it must be assumed from the books on the soul that a certain species is required for each of the selections. On these presuppositions.

Dubium I.

Ad quœ congoscedna, substantia Angeli cognoscentis gerat munus speciei? 

Tria funt genera entium, pro quibus cognoscendis meritò protest dubitari, an sustantia Angelia cognoscentis gerat musu speciei: primum est Deus Optimus Maximus; secundùm ipfe Angelus cognoscens cum omnobus fuis accidentibus tàm separabilibus, quàm inseparabilibus; tertium omnio alia entia extrinseca five materialia, five immaterialia. De his omnibus procedit præfens dubium, quoid proide eget ad fui majorem lucem in plures assetiones dividi. 

Doubt I

To what extent does the substance of the knowing Angel bear the function of a species?

There are three kinds of beings, for whose knowledge it is worth protesting whether the substance of the Angels of the knower bears the appearance of the mouth: the first is God the Most Optimum; secondly, the Angel knowing with all the accidents that were as separable as inseparable; the third to all other external beings, five material, five immaterial. Regarding all these, the main question arises, which needs to be divided into several groups.

S. I. Affertio prima circa substatiam Angeli congoscentis.

Dicendum est primò, Angelum cognoscentuem cognoscere seipsum per suam substantiam. Hanc conclusionem perpetuò tradit D. Thomas, præsertum in hac I. par. Quæst. 56. Arrt. I. quem sequuutur omne ejus scipuli, & ex Societate Suarex lib. 2. Cumatiis inumeris. 

Et probatur ratione ex D. Thoma loco proximè relato, aliisque deducta. Nam substantia Angeli habet quidquid requiritur, ut gerat minos speciei ad cognitionme sui: ergo Angelus cognoscit seipsum per suam substantiam tanquam per propriam speciem. Antecedens probatur: Nam tres conditiones requirantur in specie, videlicet quoid fit intellegibilis in actu, quod sit proportionata cum potentia, & quoid uniator cum ea; fed hæ conditiones inveniuntus in subitatia Angeli respectu congitionis sui. Minor probatur: In primis substantia Angeli elt omniono immaterialis, cum careat materia phyfic: ergo est intelligibilis in actu. Patet confequentia: nam species intelligibilis non aliter reffit objectu intelligibilie, nifi depurando illud à matera. Deinde intellectus dimanat àsubstantia Angeli tanquam ejus proprietas: ergo est de bita proportio inter substantiam Angeli & ejus intellectum. Consequentia est legitima: nulla enim major proportio protesty excogitari, quam inter substantiam & ejus propritates adæquatas. Tandem quælibey substantia est magis unita cum potentia quam quælibet alia species in ea recepta & ab extrinseco adveniens, cùm sit ab ea magis inseparabilis: ergo est etiam intimè unita cum potentia. 

Et confirmatur: Nam in visione beata essentia divina gerit munus speciei intlligibilis; non alia ratione nisi quia inveniantur tres conditiones suprà affignatæ, ut vidimus tract. 2. Disp. 2. Dub. 1. Ergo etiam substantia Angel gerit munus speciei dum cognoscit siepsum. 

S. I

The first proposition about the substance of the devouring angel.

It must be said, first, that he who knows an angel must know himself by his substance. D. Thomas continually conveys this conclusion, which he set forth in this first par. This is 56. Art. I. whom all his disciples follow, & from the Societate Suarex lib. 2. Count the cumatii.

And it is proved by reason from D. Thomas in the next place related, and deduced from others. For the substance of an Angel has all that is required, so that it bears less than a species for the knowledge of itself: therefore the Angel knows himself by his substance as by his own species. The antecedent is proved: For three conditions are specifically required, viz., what becomes intelligible in the act, what is proportionate to the power, and what unites with it; fed these conditions are to be found in the suddenness of the Angel with respect to his compulsion. The lesser is proved: In the first place the substance of the Angel is immaterial in all respects, since it lacks physical matter: therefore it is actually intelligible. The consequence is clear: for the intelligible species is not otherwise restored to the intelligible object, by the snow purifying it from its mother. Then the intellect is dependent on the substance of the Angel as if it were his property: therefore there is a twofold proportion between the substance of the Angel and his intellect. The consequence is legitimate: for no greater proportion of protest can be conceived than between substance and its adequate properties. Finally, any substance is more united with power than any other species received in it and coming from without, as it is more inseparable from it: therefore it is also intimately united with power.

And it is confirmed: For in the blessed vision the divine essence performs the function of an incomprehensible appearance; for no other reason than that the three conditions mentioned above should be found, as we have seen in the tract. 2. Disp. 2. Doubt 1. Therefore, even the substance of an angel bears the function of a species while it knows itself.

34 Respondebis cum Vasquez, concendendo in essentia Angeli respectu proprii intellectus dias priores conditiones, nempe intelligibilitatem in actu, & proportionem cum illo; negando tamen ultimam, scilicet uniouem. Nam esto effentia Angeli sit unita cum fuo intellectu; hæc tamen unio est præcisè in esse naturali, ultra quam requiritur alia unio in esst intelligibili, quę debet esse distincta à priori. Nam in unione in esse naturali essentia se habet per modum subjecti, & intellectus per modum formæ; cum tamen in unione in esse intelligibili oppositum debeat evenire. Item in qualibet unione formæ cum subjecto forma ponitur super subjectum, ideoque ad unionem intelligibilem essentiæ Angeli cum proprio intellectu requirebaturm quod ultra unionem in esse naturali, un qua essentia intelligutur priusquam intellectus, daretur alia unio, in qua intellectus esset prior, quam essentia, & hæc superponeretur supra ilium; quod difficile apparer. Ex alio capite hæc unio in esse intelligibili videtur repugnans formæ per se subsistenti, uti est essentia Angeli: nam in omnio unione ex forma & subjecto, forma habei rationem partis; quod est contra rationem formæ par se subsistentis. Hæc evasio ex omni capite corruit, si recolantur, quæ latè diximus tract. Supra relato disp. 2. Per totam. Ex quibus refellitur primo. Nam eo ipso quod susbstantia Angeli habeat: duas priores conditiones, & ultra eas unionem cum proprio intellectu in esse naturali, infallibiliter sequitur habere etiam enionem in esse intelligibili: ergo nihil ei deest ad rationem speciei. Antecendens probatut: Nam eo ipso quod essentia divina habeat illas duas priores conditiones respectu intellectus proprii & intellectus creati, & addat aliquam iutimam unionem in esse entitativo sive per identificationem, sive per intimum illapsum, necessario infertur haber unionem cum eis in esst intelligibil: ergo partier, eo ipso quod essential Angel habeat duas priores conditiones, & insuper unionem in esse naturali, infallibiliter sequitur habere etiam unionem in esse intelligibili. 

Refellitur secundo: Nam utramque unionem essentię Angeli cum ejus intellectu expresse tradit D. Thomas quæst. 8. De verit. Art. 6. Ad 2. Ubi ait: Effentia Angelic, quamuis uon poisit comparari ad intllectum ejus ut actus ad potentiam in effendo (en unionem in esse naturali) comparatur ut actus ad potentiam in intelligendo (ecce unionem in esse intelligbili, quæ sundatur in præcendenti) ergo essentia Angeli utroque genere unionis unitur cum proprio intellectu. Patet consequentia: nam in unione naturali essentia ne1uit uniri cum intellectu nifi per modum subjecti, ut optimè vidit Vazquez: ergo si ultra hanc satetur D. Thomas aliam per modum forme, & in esse inteligibili, vel expresse deseritur D. Thomas; vel concendenda est union essentiæ. Angeli per modum speciei cum proprio intellectu. 

Refellitur terio authoritate, & exemplo; simulque occurritur ad id, quod in præsata, evasione adductur de superpolitione essentiæ supra intellectum: Nam ut inquit D. Thomas loco proximè relato ad 6 Nibil probiet altquid esse in altero, & illud in eo diversis modis; sicut totum in partibus, & econverso. Ejentia enim Angeli est in intellectu ejus, sicut intelligibile in intelligent: intellectus autem in essentia sicut potentia in substantia. En quomodo concedit illam duplicem unionem. Et illam confirmat cum union partium cum nautra totali: nam nom repugnant, quod natura totalis ita se habeat per modum formæ respectu partium, quatenus eas formalizat, quod partes se habeant per modum causæ formalis, quatenus dant esse naturæ totali, quin obstet esse caufam & effectum in eodem gneere caufæ formalis, quia est in diversa specie causæ formalis, & secundum diversas confiderationes: rgo potiori titulo hoc non repugnabit inter essentiam Angeli, & ejus intellectum; cùm hoc sit in diversis ordinibus, videlicet naturali, & intelligibili. 

34 You will answer with Vasquez, conceding in the essence of the Angel with respect to his own intellect the previous conditions, namely, intelligibility in act, and proportion with it; denying, however, the last, that is, uniou. For let the effience of the Angel be united with my understanding; yet this union is precisely in natural being, beyond what is required of another union in intelligible being, which must be distinct from the former. For in the union in natural being, the essence exists by the mode of the subject, and the intellect by the mode of the form; when, however, in union, the opposite must occur in an intelligible being. Likewise, in every union of form with subject, the form is placed above the subject, and therefore for the intelligible union of the Angel’s essence with his proper intellect it was required that beyond the union in natural being, in which essence is understood before the intellect, another union should be given, in which the intellect was prior to the essence, and this should be superimposed upon it; which appears difficult. From another chapter this union in intelligible being seems to be inconsistent with the form subsisting by itself, as is the essence of an angel: for in every union of form and subject, the form has the reason of the part. which is contrary to the idea of a form subsisting on its own. This evasion has fallen from every head, if they remember what we have said in detail. The above mentioned disp. 2. Throughout. Of which it is rejected first. For by the very fact that the substance of an angel has the two previous conditions, and beyond them the union with the proper intellect in natural being, it infallibly follows that it also has enion in intelligible being: therefore it lacks nothing for the reason of particularity. The foregoing proves: For by the very fact that the divine essence has those two previous conditions with respect to its own intellect and the intellect of the created, and adds some immediate union to the entitative being, either by identification or by an inward slip, it is necessarily inferred to have union with them in intelligible being: therefore partly , by the very fact that an essential Angel has the two previous conditions, and in addition a union in a natural being, it infallibly follows that it also has a union in an intelligible being.

It is refuted in the second place: For both the union of the angel’s essence with his understanding is expressly delivered by D. Thomas. 8. Of truth. Art. 6. Ad 2. Where he says: Effentia Angelic, however, whatever may be compared to his understanding as an act to the power in the effeminate (as a union in the natural being) is compared as an act to the power in the understanding (here is the union in the intelligible being, which is found in the preceding) therefore the essence of the Angel is united to both types of union with his proper understanding. The consequence is clear: for in the natural union the essence cannot be united with the understanding of the snow through the mode of the subject, as Vazquez saw very well: therefore, if beyond this D. Thomas is satisfied with another mode of form, and in the intelligible being, or expressly, D. Thomas is abandoned; or the union of essence must be reconciled. Angels by way of appearance with their own understanding.

It is refuted by a third authority, & example; and at the same time it is met with that which is brought about in predation, by evasion, from the superposition of essence above the understanding: For as D. Thomas says in a place closely related to 6 Nibil proves that anything is in another, and that in it in different ways; as the whole in parts, and vice versa. For the essence of an angel is in his intellect, as the intelligible is in the intelligent; but the intellect is in essence as power is in substance. But how does he permit that double union? And it is confirmed by the union of the parts with the nave of the whole: for they are not inconsistent, that the nature of the whole should have such a nature in relation to the parts, in so far as it formalizes them, that the parts should have a formal cause, in so far as they give being to the nature of the whole, without hindering its existence the effect in the same genus of the formal caufus, because it is in a different kind of formal cause, and according to different confidences: therefore, with a superior title, this will not conflict between the essence of the Angel and his understanding; when this is in different orders, viz. natural and intelligible.

Quod illustrari potest alio exemplo: Nam essentia comparatur ad existentiam per modum subjecti illam recipientis; & tamen potest etiam comparari ad illam per modum causæ formalis : ergo quod essentia Angeli comparetur per modum subjecti respective ad proprium intellectum, non obest, quod possit ulterius comparari ad illum per modum formæ intelligibilis. Consequentia est legitima propter proxime dicta, & proxime dicenda. Major, & minor folum egent explicatione: Nam existentia recipitur in essentia tamquam in proprio subjecto ergo habet rationem subjecti. deinde essentia determinat existentiam ad certam speciem: ideo enim existentia est hujus speciei potius quam alterius, quia est hujus essentia: potius quam alterius. 

Ex his quærimus a Vazquio, dum partes concurrunt per modum causę formalis respectu naturæ totalis, vel superponuntur supra eam; vel non? Idemquc inquirimus de essentia respectu exiftentiæ. Quancunque igitur partem dilemmatis eligat, possumns & nos eam amplecti in cafu præfenti, quin ex hoc sequatur aliquod absurdum. 

Refellitur quartò, & simul occurritor ad id , quod addebatur de forma per se subsistenti. Nam ut inquit D. Thomas in hac I. p. . quzst. 56. art. i in corp. Nibil differt, ad boc quòd sorma sit principium actionis , quòd ipsa forma sit aliquando inberens , & quòd fit per se subsistens : non enim mimis calor calesaceret , si esset per se subsistens , quam calesacit inberens . Sic igitur, & si aliquid in genere inteIligibilium se habeat ut forma intelligibilis subsistens, intelligit seipsum. Angelus autem, cum fit immaterialis, est quedam sorma subsistens , & per boc intelligibilis actu, unde sequitur, quòd per suam sormam, que est sua substantia, seipsum intelligat. 

Maximè, quia licèt sit contra rationem formæ: per se sublistentis oniri cum aliquo subjecto autquasi subjecto per inhærentiam aut informationem, hoc est in esse naturali ; non tamen est contra ejus perfecttionem uniri in esse intelligibili, ut liquet in essentia divina unita intellectui beati: ergo ex hoc capite non est, cur ratio speciei denegari debeat essentiæ Angeli respectu proprii intellectus. Antecedens probatur ex discrimine præcipuo inter unionem intelligibilem, & unionem per informationem aut inhærentiam: in unione enim intelligibili forma non limitatur à subjecto , sed est in eo cum tota sua amplitudine , ut pluries diximus tract. 2. disput. supra citata: econversò in unione per informationem aut inhærentiam forma limitatur serfubjectum. Ex quo oritur aliud discrimen, nempe quod forma in posteriori unione habet propriè rationem partis, secus vero in priori . Utrunque autem discrimen ortum ducit ex alio principio inter nos inconcusso, & satis in Arist. & D.Thoma firmato loco proximè relato, nempe quod forma intelligibilis unitur per identitatem cum intellectu , cujus oppositum evenit in unione fivé per inhærentiam five per informationem: ergo non est contra rationem formæ per se subsistentis uniri per modum formæ intelligibilis.

This can be illustrated by another example: For essence is compared to existence by way of the subject receiving it; and yet it can also be compared to it by the mode of a formal cause: therefore, the fact that the essence of an Angel is compared by the mode of a subject relative to its own understanding does not prevent it from being further compared to it by the mode of an intelligible form. The consequence is legitimate because of what has just been said, and what must be said next. The major and minor folios need explanation: for existence is received in essence as in its own subject, therefore it has the aspect of a subject. then the essence determines the existence of a certain species: for therefore the existence is of this species rather than of another, because it is the essence of this rather than of another.

From these we seek from Vazquius, while the parts converge by means of a formal cause with respect to the total nature, or are superimposed upon it; or not? We inquire in the same way about the essence with respect to the existence. Therefore, whichever side of the dilemma he chooses, we can embrace it in the prefect’s cafu, without any absurdity following from this.

The fourth is rejected, and at the same time it meets what was added about the form subsisting by itself. For as D. Thomas says in this I. p. . because 56. art. i in corp. Nibil differs, to the point that the sorma is the principle of action, that the form itself is sometimes infering, and that it becomes subsisting by itself: for the heat would not warm the mime, if it were subsisting in itself, than it is warmed by the subsisting. Thus, therefore, if something in the genus of the unintelligible has itself as a subsisting intelligible form, it understands itself. But the angel, when he becomes immaterial, is a certain sorma subsisting, and is actually intelligible through the goat, whence it follows that he understands himself through his sorma, which is his substance.

Most of all, because it is allowed to be contrary to the reason of the form: to be subsisting in itself with some subject, or subject as it were, by inherence or information, this is in natural being; however, it is not contrary to its perfection to be united in an intelligible being, as is clear in the divine essence united to the blessed intellect. The antecedent is proved from the principal distinction between intelligible union, and union by information or inherence: for in intelligible union the form is not limited to the subject, but is in it with all its amplitude, as we have said several times in the tract. 2. dispute as quoted above: the slave object is limited in the form of information or inherence in the union. From this arises another distinction, namely, that the form in the latter union has properly the nature of the part, but otherwise in the former. On both sides, however, the dispute arises from another unshaken principle between us, and enough in Arist. & D.Thomas established in the next place related, namely, that the intelligible form is united by identity with the intellect, the opposite of which occurs in the union of five and five through the inherence of five through information: therefore it is not contrary to the principle of a form subsisting in itself to be united by means of an intelligible form.

7 Ex dictis infertur, Angelum per suam substantiam tanquam per speciem cognoscere suas proprietates. Et ratio est: Nam species repræsentans quidditativè & comprehensivè aliquam formam conducit ad cognoscenda omnia ea, quæ in illa continentur , & quorum est radix & origo; sed substantia Angeli est hujusmodi respectu suarum proprietatum: ergo Angelus per suam substantiam cognoscit suas proprietates. Et confirmatur: Nam species accidentalis residens in uno Angelo & repræsentans alium , simul repræsentat omnes ejus proprietates : ergo idem dicendum est de substantia Angeli quidditativè repræsentante seipsam in ordine ad suas proprietates. Dubium tamen est de aliis accidentibus in Angelo cognoscente existentibus, an per suam substantiam tamquam per speciem ea cognoscat . Sed de hoc idem judicium ferendum est ac de accidentibus communibus existentibus in quolibet Angelo, itaut si unus Angelus per speciem, qua alium cognoscit quidditative & comprehensivè, cognoscit etiam omnia ejus accidentia communia , etiam Angelus cognoscens se per suam substantiam cognoscit per eam omnia sua accidentia communia: par enim est in utroque cafu ratio. Sed ad hoc ex insra dicendis constabit .

Oppositam sententiam noftræ assertioni defendunt Alensis , Marsilius , & Henricus , quibus adjungi potest Vazquez, quatenus docet, Angelum ad cognoscendum seipsum non indigere specie distincta ab ejus intellectu, sed ipsum intellectum susfcere. Eorum tamen argumenta soluta manent tract. 2. disp. 2. dub. i.& 4. ubi omnino videri debent, ne acta iterum agamus.

7 From what has been said, it is inferred that an angel knows his properties by his substance as by his species. And the reason is: For representing a species in a quiddity and comprehensive manner, it leads to some form to know all those things which are contained in it, and of which it is the root and origin; but the substance of an Angel is of this kind with respect to its properties: therefore the Angel knows his properties by means of his substance. And it is confirmed: For an accidental species residing in one Angel and representing another, at the same time represents all its properties: therefore the same must be said of the substance of an Angel, which represents itself in order to its properties. However, there is a doubt about other accidents existing in the knowing angel, whether he knows them through his substance as if through his species. But the same judgment must be made about this as about the common accidents existing in every Angel, so that if one Angel by the species by which he knows another quidditatively and comprehensively, also knows all his common accidents, even an Angel knowing himself through his substance knows through it all his accidents common: for the reason is equal in both cafus. But this will be clear from what has been said.

Alensis, Marsilius, and Henricus defend the opposite opinion to our assertion, to whom Vazquez may be joined, inasmuch as he teaches that an angel, in order to know himself, does not need a species distinct from his understanding, but that the understanding itself is sufficient. Their arguments, however, remain unsolved. 2. disp. 2. doubt i.& 4. where they must be seen at all, lest we repeat the acts again.